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Comparative Regionalism  
A New Research Agenda
Tanja A. Börzel
Abstract
After the end of the Cold War, students of International Relations observed an expansion of inter-state 
activities at the regional level. Regional and sub-regional groupings appeared to gain momentum as the 
way in which countries cooperate and should cooperate to pursue peace, stability, wealth and social justice. 
The surge and resurgence of regionalism has triggered the proliferation of concepts and approaches. The 
focus of this paper will be on processes and structures of state-led regionalism driven by the delegation 
of policies and political authority to regional institutions. Based on this understanding of regionalism, the 
existing literature will be reviewed with regard to three general questions. These questions do not only re-
quire research across regions but also allow developing a common research agenda to accumulate knowl-
edge generated about specific regions. First, what are the outcomes of regionalism? How can we describe 
and compare the results of the delegation of policies and political authority? Second, what are the drivers 
of regionalism? Why do some governments choose to delegate policies and political authority while others 
do not? Finally, what are the internal effects of regionalism? How does the delegation of policies and politi-
cal authority impact back on the domestic structures of the states involved?
The Author
Tanja A. Börzel is Professor of Political Science and holds the chair for European 
Integration at the Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, Freie Universität 
Berlin. Her research concentrates on questions of Governance, institutional 
change as a result of Europeanization as well as on the diffusion of ideas 
and policies within and outside of the European Union. Since October 2008, 
she coordinates the Research College “The Transformative Power of Europe” 
together with Thomas Risse. 
Contact: europe@zedat.fu-berlin.de4 | KFG Working Paper No. 28| August 2011 
Contents
1.   Introduction                  5
2.   The History of Regionalism: European Integration and Beyond      6
3.   The Outcome of Regionalism: Inter-, Supra- or Post-National?      8
     3.1	 From	Cooperation	to	Integration	 	 	 	 	 	 8
      3.2  New	and	Old	Regionalism	 	 	 	 	 	 	 10
      3.3	 Persisting	Diversity	or	Emerging	Similarity?	 	 	 	 	 13
4.   The Drivers of Regionalism: Old Theories and New Puzzles        16
     4.1  The	Demand	for	Regionalism.	It	Is	Not	Only	the	Economy,	Stupid!		 	 16
      4.2  The	Supply	of	Regionalism.	Interests,	Power,	and	Norms	 	 	 	 20
5.   When Regionalism Hits Home. Policy Harmonization and Structural Change   22
     5.1	 From	Second	Image	Reversed...	 	 	 	 	 	 	 22
						5.2	 ...	to	Europeanization	and	Domestic	Change	 	 	 	 	 23
6.   Conclusions                   26
Literature                    28                                                                   Comparative Regionalism | 5
1.  Introduction1
After the end of the Cold War, students of International Relations (IR) observed an expansion of inter-state 
activities at the regional level. Regional and sub-regional groupings appeared to gain momentum as the 
way in which countries cooperate and should cooperate to pursue peace, stability, wealth and social jus-
tice. The surge and resurgence of regionalism has triggered the proliferation of concepts and approaches. 
There is new and old regionalism, regionalism in its first, second and third generation; economic, monetary, 
security and cultural regionalism, state regionalism, shadow regionalism; cross-, inter-, trans-, and multi-
regionalism; pure and hybrid regionalism; offensive, extroverted, open, or neoliberal as opposed to de-
fensive, introverted, closed, resistance, regulatory and developmental regionalism; lower level and higher 
level regionalism; North, South, and North-South regionalism; informal and institutional regionalism – just 
to name a few of the labels the literature has come up with to account for the new trend in International 
Relations.
The concept of regionalism is as diverse as its object of study. There is no commonly accepted definition 
of what a region is (cf. Sbragia 2008). Most would agree that a region implies some “geographical proxim-
ity and contiguity” (Hurrell 1995: 353), and mutual interdependence (Nye 1965: vii). Some would add 
a certain degree of cultural homogeneity (Russett 1967), sense of community (Deutsch et al. 1957), or 
“regioness” (Hettne/Söderbaum 2000). Regionalism, then, refers to processes and structures of region-
building in terms of closer economic, political, security and socio-cultural linkages between states and 
societies that geographically proximate. In political science, regionalism is often used synonymous with 
regional cooperation and regional integration, which could be seen as the opposite ends of a continuum 
along which regionalism may vary.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to do justice to the various bodies of literature that have emerged in 
the field of (comparative) regionalism. The focus will be on processes and structures of state-led region-
alism driven by the delegation of policies and political authority to regional institutions. Based on this 
more narrow understanding of regionalism, the existing literature will be reviewed with regard to three 
general questions. These questions do not only require research across regions but also allow developing 
a common research agenda to accumulate knowledge generated about specific regions. First, what are the 
outcomes of regionalism? How can we describe and compare the results of the delegation of policies and 
political authority? Second, what are the drivers of regionalism? Why do some governments choose to 
delegate policies and political authority while others do not? Finally, what are the internal effects of region-
alism? How does the delegation of policies and political authority impact back on the domestic structures 
of the states involved? Before reviewing the state of the art on these three questions, the chapter will trace 
the history of the study of regionalism in IR.
1  This  paper  benefitted  from  comments  and  suggestions  by  Eugenia  Conceicao-Heldt,  Liesbet  Hooghe,  Vera 
van Hüllen, Jolyon Howorth, Anja Jetschke, Tobias Lenz, David Levi-Four, Ulrike Lorenz, Gary Marks, Thomas 
Risse, Osvaldo Saldías, Vivien Schmidt, Beth Simmons, and the participants of the KFG Research Colloquium 
“Transformative Power of Europe”.6 | KFG Working Paper No. 28| August 2011 
2.  The History of Regionalism: European Integration and Beyond
The study of regionalism has a long history and evolved in several waves giving rise to quite diverse bod-
ies of literature. The creation of the United Nations spurred a debate on whether regional organizations 
would be better suited than universal organization to settle disputes and conflicts among geographically 
proximate states (Haas 1956; Wilcox 2965). While the universalist-regionalist debate was about security 
issues, the emergence of European integration in the 1950s shifted attention towards economic regional-
ism, particularly when attempts to establish a European Defence Community had failed in 1953. After 
European states had fought two major wars of global scale in less than 50 years, regionalism became the 
strategy for securing peace and reconciliation in Europe. The delegation of national sovereignty rights to a 
regional authority should tame nationalism and foster the peaceful resolution of international conflict. The 
key question was how to overcome the reluctance of states to give up sovereignty. The so-called federalist 
approaches advocated a radical solution by which a constitutional convention of the peoples of Europe 
would create a United States of Europe. Students of International Relations were less optimistic that nation 
states would simply transfer their sovereignty to a newly created European (federal) state (Spinelli/Rossi 
2006 (1941)). Functionalism therefore recommended starting cooperation in limited functional, technical, 
and/or economic areas of “low politics” where sovereignty losses would be limited while the pooling of 
technical expertise in administrative networks would yield tangible benefits by solving common problems. 
The experience of mutually beneficial cooperation and the functional linkage between issue areas was to 
create further incentives for the gradual expansion of tasks (Mitrany 1943).  
Such spill-over effects also formed the core of neo-functionalism as coined by Ernst Haas. Yet, he em-
phasized the importance of politics since regional integration always produced winners and losers (Haas 
1958,  1964; Lindberg 1963; Lindberg/Scheingold 1971). Moreover, neo-functionalism focused on the role 
of transnationally organized pressure groups rather than technocratic and administrative networks as the 
main actors behind functional task expansion to the regional level. Business interests were better served 
by market integration at the regional level and therefore they would push for the delegation of policies 
and political authority to regional institutions. With policies increasingly made at the regional rather than 
the national level, economic and societal actors would increasingly shift their expectations and loyalties 
towards regional institutions giving rise to a new political community, in which states would settle their 
conflicts peacefully.
Community-building was also at the core of transactionalist approaches as developed by Karl Deutsch 
(Deutsch et al. 1957). His “security community” was formed by a group of states, which no longer consid-
ered force as a means to solve conflict. They remain formerly independent in pluralistic security communi-
ties. If states engaged in peaceful change agreed to politically merge they became amalgamated security 
community. While regional institutions helped solve conflicts, cross-border social and economic transac-
tions and communication were seen as the main drivers of community-building. Both, neofunctionalism 
and transactionalism considered transnational interests as the main actors in overcoming the resistance of 
states against regionalism. Intergovernmentalism, by contrast, followed realist reasoning and insisted that 
states remained resilient to shifting policies and political authority to regional institutions, particularly in 
areas of “high politics” (Hoffmann 1966).                                                                   Comparative Regionalism | 7
The founding of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 and its rapid deepening into a customs 
union had vindicated neofunctionalist thinking. It had also touched off a wave of regionalism in other parts 
of the world, particularly in Latin America and to a lesser extent in Africa (Malamud 2010; Fawcett/Gandois 
2010), and induced some first attempts at comparative regionalism by testing neofunctionalist explana-
tions beyond Europe (Haas/Schmitter 1964; Haas 1967; Nye 1965). Yet, plans for a European Economic 
and Monetary Union failed and the integration process seemed to stall in the 1970s. Likewise, efforts at 
“South-South” integration largely remained ineffective. The absence of certain context conditions, such as 
high level of economic and political pluralism, could account for why regionalism in other parts of the world 
proved far less successful (Haas 1970). Neofunctionalism could not explain, however, why European states 
abandoned collective problem-solving in times of crisis. With regionalism not making progress in Europe 
and other parts of the world, Haas declared regional integration theory altogether obsolete (Haas 1975).
The Single European Act of 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1990 ended the times of “eurosclerosis”. 
Together with the end of the Cold War, the broadening and deepening of the European Community into 
a European Union did not only trigger another wave of regionalism outside Europe with the US departing 
from its exclusively multilateral approach to global free trade and states in Africa and Latin America revi-
talizing existing regional organizations (Fawcett/Gandois 2010; Malamud 2010). It also led to a revival of 
theorizing about European integration and a reformulation of both neofunctionalist and intergovernmen-
talist approaches. Supranational institutionalism explained the leap of 1986 and 1990 as a spill-over from 
market integration to market regulation and emphasized not only the role of the European Commission 
(Sandholtz/Zysman 1989) but also of the European Court of Justice whose dynamic interpretation of the 
Treaty of Rome had facilitated the gradual expansion of tasks as early as in the 1960s and 1970s, when 
European integration had allegedly been in the doldrums (Burley/Mattli 1993; Stone Sweet/Sandholtz 
1998a). Liberal intergovernmentalists contended that national governments remained the masters of the 
treaties and explained the delegation of policies and political authority to supranational institutions as a 
way to improve collective problem-solving at the regional level. They concurred with neofunctionalist and 
supranationalist approaches on the importance of domestic (economic) interests but insisted that their 
demand for more integration was channeled through national governments rather than transnational alli-
ances with supranational actors, who could not simply circumvent national governments as the gate keep-
ers of EU decision-making (Moravcsik 1998). The European Commission and the European Court of Justice 
were conceived as agents acting at the behest of the member states to advance collective problem-solving 
at the regional level (Pollack 1997).
The debate between supranational and liberal intergovernmentalist theories shifted the focus of European 
integration studies from process towards outcome. Multi-level governance approaches emphasized the 
sharing of political authority in the EU among a mix of state and non-state actors at different levels of gov-
ernment (Hooghe/Marks 2001). The “governance turn” (Kohler-Koch/Rittberger 2006) ended the domi-
nance of IR theories and opened the field of EU studies for comparative politics and public policy analysis 
(Hix 1994; Wallace/Wallace 1996). Studying the EU as a polity with its own politics and policy-making 
also paved the way for social constructivism, which engaged in a debate with rationalist and historical 
institutionalist approaches (Pierson 1996; Aspinwall/Schneider 2000) about how institutions mattered in 
European integration emphasizing the importance of processes of socialization as well as collective identi-
ties and public discourse (Checkel 1999; Risse 2003; Diez 1999).8 | KFG Working Paper No. 28| August 2011 
After the end of the Cold War, the EU grew from 12 to 27 member states, which required institutional 
reforms that eventually resulted in the drafting of a Constitutional Treaty by a European Convention in 
2003. Its rejection by two referenda in France and the Netherlands, respectively, as well as the adoption 
of most of the reforms in form of yet another intergovernmental treaty in Lisbon 2009, are likely to trigger 
new theoretical developments in (European) integration studies since neither supranationalist nor liberal 
intergovernmentalist approaches can fully account for the stop-and-go in the European integration process 
(Hooghe/Marks 2009).
EU studies have developed into a sub-discipline of IR, with distinctive concepts and theories. At the same 
time, regionalism gained prominence outside Europe where the end of the Cold War and the Asian financial 
crisis seemed to have fueled attempts at regional integration. Particularly students in area studies felt that 
both the IR and the EU literature had little to offer that could help them understand processes of regional-
ism in Africa or Asia. The so-called “New Regionalism” literature has therefore taken a different approach 
that emphasizes the social construction of regions, the role of non-state actors other than pressure groups 
as well as the importance of cultural and environmental aspects (Hettne et al. 1999; Söderbaum/Shaw 
2003; Farrell et al. 2005). Finally, International Political Economy (IPE) gave rise to another important body 
of research on regionalism focusing on regional trade and investment patterns and the design of regional 
institutions to foster liberalization and settle disputes over market access. The main dependent variable is 
the emergence and effectiveness of preferential and free trade areas (PTA and FTA), whose number is suf-
ficiently large to apply statistical methods to test varies strands of (rational) institutionalist theories (inter	
alia	Milner 1988; Mansfield/Milner 1997; Mansfield/Reinhardt 2003).
In sum, comparative regionalism as a field of study has been informed by various bodies of research that 
focus on different aspects and hardly engage with each other. The remainder of this chapter therefore 
seeks to cut across the different sub-disciplines of IR when taking stock of our empirical and theoretical 
knowledge of regionalism.
3.  The Outcome of Regionalism: Inter-, Supra- or Post-National?
3.1		 From	Cooperation	to	Integration
International Relations treats regionalism as an instance of international cooperation (Haas 1970; Hoffmann 
1966; Puchala 1972). Much of the early research concentrated on the European Community/European 
Union as a long-standing pathfinder in economic and political regionalism. Yet, by 1951 the European 
Community of Coal and Steel was already more than an international organization. The analytical tool 
box of IR scholars has always had its limits in capturing the nature of the EU (Puchala 1972). Ultimately, 
students of the EU declared it unique and described its sui	generis nature by new concepts such as a “new, 
post-Hobbsian order” (Schmitter 1991), “a post-modern state” (Ruggie 1993; Caporaso 1996), “a network 
of pooling and sharing sovereignty”(Keohane/ and Hoffmann 1991), a “system of multi-level governance” 
(Hooghe and /Marks 2001) or “network governance” (Eising/ Kohler-Koch 1999). Making the EU a singular 
case, however, precludes by definition any comparison with other regional institutions.                                                                   Comparative Regionalism | 9
The IPE literature managed to avoid such conceptual problems in the first place by looking at economic 
rather than political regionalism. Existing typologies of economic integration focus on the issue areas cov-
ered by regional agreements (trade and/or money) and the degree of interference with national authority 
on economic affairs (shallow vs. deep, cf. Balassa 1973). The shallowest and most frequent form of trade 
integration is a preferential trade area (PTA) between two or more countries, which reduces (rather than 
eliminates) tariffs for certain products. A free trade area (FTA) is a PTA in which all barriers to trade are 
eliminated. Customs unions are FTA with a common external tariff, which involves the delegation of some 
trade authority to regional institutions. Common and single markets go even one step further by providing 
not only for the free movement of goods but also of services, capital and labor. The final stage of trade 
integration is the economic union, which combines the single market with a monetary union. The depth of 
monetary integration can equally vary. While the pegging of a state’s currency to that of another state is 
a unilateral and informal commitment, currency boards maintain a fixed exchange rate with a foreign cur-
rency, e.g. the US Dollar or the Euro. The deepest form of monetary integration is a currency or monetary 
union, in which several states share the same currency and establish a supranational central bank to set 
interest rates. If states use a foreign currency, this is referred to as dollarization (cf. Hancock 2009: 23-25).
The typology of economic integration may be comprehensive. But it blurs two dimensions that ought to 
be kept separate because they may be causally related. The first dimension, which has been referred to 
as the scope or breadth of (policy) integration (Lindberg 1970; Lindberg/Scheingold 1970), relates to the 
issues to be dealt with at the regional level (what sector, how much of it, and how important). These 
issues do not only concern the dismantling of national barriers to economic exchange (market-making) 
and the dealing with negative externalities of liberalization (market-correcting; cf. Scharpf 1996). Next to 
trade and money (economic	regionalism), security (security	regionalism), constitutional issues referring to 
institutional norms, rules and procedures (political	regionalism) and socio-cultural policy including sustain-
able development, health, social security and culture (socio-cultural	regionalism) can become subject of 
regionalism. The more policy areas are dealt with at the regional level, the broader integration becomes.
The second dimension, sometimes called level or depth of integration (Lindberg 1970; Lindberg/Scheingold 
1970), concerns the political authority regional institutions have over the issue delegated to them.2 The 
delegation or centralization of policy tasks and political authority has provided the starting point for most 
of the literature that seeks to develop a comparative analytical framework for the outcomes of regionalism 
(Stone Sweet/Sandholtz 1998b; Hooghe/Marks 2001; Koremenos et al. 2004; Cooley/Spruyt 2009). The 
weakest form of delegation involves administrative tasks, such as the preparation of intergovernmental 
meetings or the compilation of information (administration). Substantial delegation, in turn, gives regional 
institutions the power to adopt collectively binding decisions (legislative authority) and to implement 
them (executive authority), as well as the autonomy to settle disputes (adjudicative authority). Depending 
on how much autonomy the regional agents have in exercising their authority and how much they can 
encroach on national sovereignty rights, regional institutions are intergovernmentalist (minimal auton-
omy) or supranationalist (maximum authority). Unlike in intergovernmentalist institutions, where states 
compromise their sovereignty at best by allowing for majority decisions and only delegate certain policy 
2  Kathleen Hancock shows in her comparative study on “plutocratic” regional organizations that states can also 
delegate authority to the wealthiest member state (Hancock 2009).10 | KFG Working Paper No. 28| August 2011 
functions to administrative or expert committees, states transfer political authority to supranationalist 
institutions enabling them to take and enforce collectively binding decisions against their will (Scharpf 
2001; Börzel 2010a).
Regionalism can be placed on a continuum with regional	(intergovernmental)	cooperation and regional	
(supranational)	integration as two opposite ends. Regional cooperation	entails the joint exercise of state-
based political authority in intergovernmental institutions to solve collective action problems related to 
economic, political or security issues. Regional	integration, by contrast, involves the setting-up of suprana-
tional institutions to which political authority is delegated to make collectively binding decisions, e.g. on 
dismantling national barriers to economic and social exchange (market-making), on dealing with negative 
externalities of liberalization (market-correcting; cf. Scharpf 1996) or on peacefully settling international 
conflicts (Adler/Barnett 1998).
3.2	 New	and	Old	Regionalism
The distinction between different outcomes offers some interesting insights regarding the quantity and 
quality of regionalism. It puts the widely shared observation that regionalism has surged after the end of 
the Cold War into context.3 Claims about the “new urge to merge” (Schulz et al. 2001: 1) are often based on 
the “explosion” of regional agreements registered with the World Trade Organization (cf. Choi/Caporaso 
2002; Hancock 2009: 17-25). By June 2011, the number of regional accords had increased more than five 
times compared to 1990. Yet, a closer look at the data reveals that the changes are less spectacular than the 
sheer increase in numbers may suggest. First, of the 489 regional accords registered with the WTO only 297 
are in force. Second, a considerable number of the regional trade agreements (about 40 per cent) do not 
have more than two members, which are in the majority of cases not contiguous either.4 About 50 per cent 
are bilateral and/or include partners from distant regions. Third, the depth of (regional) integration is in the 
most cases rather shallow. 90 per cent of the regional accords refer to preferential or free trade areas (PTA 
and FTA).5 There are only nine customs unions (four of which involve the EU), six common markets, and 
four economic unions.6 The number of regional organizations has not surged either.7 While they may have 
3  Inter  alia  Mansfield/Milner  1999;  Mattli  1999b;  Fawcett/Hurrell  2000;  Breslin  2002;  Buzan/Weaver  2003; 
Katzenstein 2005; Acharya/Johnston 2007.
4  The WTO defines regional trade agreements as “agreements concluded between countries not necessarily be-
longing  to  the  same  geographical  region”  (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/scope_rta_e.htm, 
last access 17 July 2011). RTAs are forms of preferential trade liberalization which by definition cannot be global 
(cf. Art. 24; http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regatt_e.htm#gatt; last access 17 July 2011).
5  The numbers are drawn from the WTO database on regional trade agreements (RTA), which includes only 202 
RTA in force (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm; last access 17 July 2011).
6  Note that each economic and monetary union is a common market and a custom union, and each common 
market is a custom union. We count every regional organization only once at its deepest stage of economic inte-
gration. The numbers are drawn from the WTO Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS); http://
rtais.wto.org/UI/publicPreDefRepByRTAType.aspx; and the McGill University PTA Database http://ptas.mcgill.ca/
index.php; last access 17 July 2011.
7  There is no authoritative definition of regional organizations. Unlike international organizations, their geographic                                                                    Comparative Regionalism | 11
gained in importance, prominent regional organizations, including the League of Arab States (1945), the 
Organization of American States (1948), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949), the Council of Europe 
(1949), the European Union (1957), the European Free Trade Area (1960), the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (1967), the Caribbean Community and Common Market (1973), the Economic Community of 
West African States (1975), the Organization (formerly Conference) of Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(1975), the Gulf Cooperation Council (1981) or the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (1985), 
originated well before the end of the Cold War. Others, such as the South African Development Community 
(1992), the Andean Community (1996) and the African Union (2002), were reestablishments. Of the more 
than 50 “multiple issues” regional organizations that exist to date, only 16 were founded after 1990. A third 
of them are located in the post-Soviet region, which has received little attention in the literature so far (but 
see Hancock 2009; Collins 2009; Wirminghaus 2012). Undoubtedly, regionalism has increased over time. 
But the Cold War is not necessarily a watershed (see Table 1). We have seen waves of regionalism before, 
e.g. in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in Latin America (Fawcett/Serrano 2005).
Table	1:	The	Emergence	of	Regional	Organisations	since	1945
basis precludes global membership (Nye 1971: 8). While the Handbook of International Organizations lists about 
100 regional organizations, only half of them cover a broader spectrum of functions and tasks that touch upon 
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Analyzing the delegation of policies and political authority to regional institutions also takes issue with 
claims on the emergence of a qualitatively “new regionalism”. First, whether the (quantitative) increase 
in PTA and FTA indicates a (qualitative) shift away from “introverted, defensive regional blocs” towards 
innovative and open forms of regionalism that is more compatible with the global trade regime remains 
an open question (Milner 1992; Bhagwati 2008). While these forms of shallow economic regionalism have 
been spreading, we also see a deepening and widening of existing forms that started in some cases well be-
fore the 1990s. Long-standing regional organizations, such as the League of Arab States (LAS), the European 
Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), have experienced the delegation of more authority and new policy competencies as well 
as the admission of new members. With the creation of the Asian Free Trade Area, ASEAN established for 
the first time a dispute settlement procedure breaking with the ASEAN way of informal and consensus-
based institutions (Kanthak 2012; Korte 2012). The ASEAN Charter provides another major step towards 
both more political and more legalized integration (Krome 2012; Goltermann 2012). The League of Arab 
States, which has shared the reluctance of ASEAN to delegate political authority to regional institutions, 
has become more forthcoming and is planning institutional changes that bear some striking similarities 
with some changes the Economic Community of West African States introduced (Koitsch 2012). Similar to 
MERCOSUR (Pirzer 2012) and ASEAN (Krome 2012), ECOWAS committed its members to democracy and 
seems to have outpaced the EU with its power to use military coercion in order to safeguard democracy 
(Striebinger 2012).
Second, it is unclear to what extent such quantitative and qualitative changes constitute a new phenom-
enon that calls for a new approach. Proponents of the “new regionalism approach” have claimed that 
mainstream theories are “neither designed for nor capable of capturing the multidimensionality, pluralism 
and comprehensiveness of contemporary regionalization processes, nor the way in which they are socially 
constructed” (Schulz et al. 2001: 2; Hettne/Söderbaum 2000). IR research might be biased towards state-
driven forms of regionalism neglecting more spontaneous and endogenous processes, which involve a 
variety of non-state actors organized in formal and informal networks. How relevant these “new” forms 
of regionalism are and to what extent existing theories are adequate to capture them is first of all an 
empirical question (cf. Hettne 2005: 543; Hettne/Söderbaum 2008; for a suggestion on how to overcome 
the “false divide” see Warleigh-Lack 2006). We find state-led regionalism in all parts of the world, including 
those that have been neglected by both the “old” and “new” regionalism literature. The area of the former 
Soviet Union alone features more than three dozens of regional initiatives based on intergovernmental ne-
gotiations and treaties (Wirminghaus 2012). The “alphabet soup” of post-Soviet regionalism shows great 
similarities with the “spaghetti bowl” regionalism in Africa.
Finally, there is not only a trend towards the delegation of new policy competencies and more political 
authority within major regional organizations. They have developed some interesting similarities despite 
differences in their original goals and institutional set-up. Not only do the Arab League, the EU, ASEAN, 
ECOWAS and Mercosur aspire to deeper forms of trade and monetary integration, for instance by seeking 
to turn their free trade area into a customs union or a common market and to harmonize their monetary 
policies (Spielau 2012). They have also taken on new tasks in the realm of external and internal security, 
dealing with issues such as nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament, territorial disputes, domestic political 
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developed some albeit rudimentary forms of security cooperation (terrorism, drugs, and migration) in the 
aftermath of September 11, 2001. 
3.3	 Persisting	Diversity	or	Emerging	Similarity?
States are still reluctant to delegate political authority to regional organizations. But they have agreed 
to formalize decision-making procedures, opening them for majority decisions, and to set-up enhanced 
dispute-settlement procedures, which may take the form of courts or tribunals. While legislative authority 
firmly remains in the hands of national governments, the powers of executive bodies have been strength-
ened, and in some cases, parliamentary assemblies with consultative status have been created (Koitsch 
2012; Korte 2012; Krome 2012; Hummel/Lohaus 2012). These institutional changes have emerged over a 
long period of time although the intensity and speed of reforms have increased in the last two decades. 
While regional institutions do not converge towards a particular model, they show increasing similarities, 
with regard to the delegation of new policy competencies as well as of executive and adjudicative authority 
(Table 2). At the same time, important differences remain. 
The member states of MERCOSUR, ASEAN and the LAS have not been willing to match the delegation of 
political authority witnessed in the EU or ECOWAS (Hummel/Lohaus 2012; Koitsch 2012; Kanthak 2012; 
Goltermann 2012). ECOWAS and the African Union, by contrast, even acquired the coercive power to mili-
tarily intervene in their member states which the EU still lacks (Striebinger 2012). The judicial authority 
of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) with regard to dispute-settlement is not matched by any 
legislative and or executive authority (Kanthak 2012; Korte 2012).
Table	2:	The	Progressing	Delegation	of	Policies	and	Political	Authority
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In sum, rather than the emergence of new forms of regionalism, there is a bifurcation between (rather 
classical) regional cooperation, on the one hand, and regional integration, on the other. While shallow eco-
nomic regionalism based on intergovernmental cooperation seems to proliferate, already existing forms 
of regionalism have not only moved towards regional integration by deepening and broadening; they have 
also developed some institutional similarities. This bifurcation has been largely overlooked since different 
bodies of literature have focused on different forms of regionalism. Moreover, these developments raise 
the question to what extent regionalism differs between regions not only with regard to outcomes but 
also its major drivers. Do states respond to a common demand for (enhanced) delegation of policies and 
political authority emanating from the challenges of globalization and transnationalization that is best 
satisfied at the regional level? Are regional institutions supplied by powerful states to pursue their national 
interests in market access and political stability of their “backyards”? Or is regionalism part of a global 
script which diffuses depicting regional institutions as effective and legitimate governance structures in 
the 21st century?
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4.  The Drivers of Regionalism: Old Theories and New Puzzles
The IR literature offers a multitude of approaches to regionalism. However, no single theory could possibly 
account for the variation in outcomes. International Political Economy (IPE) has mostly been concerned 
with economic regionalism explaining the emergence and evolution of preferential and free trade areas 
(shallow economic regionalism). In line with the general IR literature, IPE text books are organized around 
four major theoretical perspectives on regionalism, which draw on neo-realism, neoliberal institutionalism, 
social constructivism and Marxism-structuralism, respectively. While they offer important insights, these 
schools of thought are less appropriate to study broader and deeper forms of regionalism that involve the 
delegation of political authority across a wider range of issues.
Theories of European integration had to move beyond economic regionalism and developed explanations 
for the progressive delegation of political authority and policies to the supranational institutions of the 
European Union also in other areas than market integration. Yet, neofunctionalism and liberal intergov-
ernmentalism (and their various offsprings) have only partially been able to account for the process and 
outcome of European integration. Nor do they travel easily to other regions of the world which do not 
share the same level of economic development and interdependence and are more heterogeneous with 
regard to their political regimes.
Since the literature has focused on different forms of regionalism, the scope of the various approaches is 
limited and there is no theory that could possibly account for the two empirical trends we observe. Yet, 
theories in IPE, IR, EU and Area Studies have identified important causes of regionalism, which deploy 
significant, albeit varying explanatory power across the globe. The next section will organize the various 
bodies of literature around major drivers of regionalism, which are distinguished as demand- and supply-
driven factors (for a similar approach see Mattli 1999a: 41-43). Their causal effects can follow either an 
instrumentalist (rationalist) or a norm-based (sociological) logic of social action. Such a factor-oriented 
approach should facilitate comparative research across regions and help engage the various bodies of 
literature.
4.1		 The	Demand	for	Regionalism.	It	Is	Not	Only	the	Economy,	Stupid!
Rationalist	approaches have predominantly focused on explaining economic	regionalism. They point to 
expected (material) gains as the main drivers of the demand for (more) regionalism. Theories differ, then, 
with regard to what these gains exactly are. Economists emphasize welfare enhancing effects, which tend 
to be greater among geographically proximate states. These include reduced transaction costs, economies 
of scale, technological innovation due to greater competition, more foreign direct investments and greater 
economic and political weight in international markets and institutions (cf. Mattli 1999b: 46f; Hancock 2009: 
25-29). Accordingly, globalization becomes a major driver for economic regionalism since global markets 
entail increased transborder mobility and economic linkages and trade issues are less cumbersome to deal 
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as diversions of trade and investment, provides another rational to pursue economic regionalism. States 
may either seek membership in regional institutions generating the external effects as many European 
countries have done in the case of the EU and some of the South American countries do with NAFTA (Mattli 
1999b: 59-61). Or they create their own regional group. NAFTA can be interpreted as the US’ reaction to 
the fortification of the Single European Market and the emerging economic regionalism in Asia (Mattli 
1999b: 183-185). A similar “domino effect” (Baldwin 1995) was triggered by the US’ turn towards regional-
ism which has contributed to the proliferation of regional PTA, since states perceived the US as no longer 
capable of or willing to ensure the stability of the global trading system (Mansfield 1998). The decision of 
1992 to complement the ASEAN security community with an ASEAN free trade area is partly explained by 
concerns over the global positioning of ASEAN markets vis-à-vis NAFTA and the Single European Market 
(Means 1995).
Neofunctionalist and liberal intergovernmentalist approaches provide more “liberal”, society-centered 
explanations for economic regionalism. The demand is fueled by those domestic interests that tend to 
benefit from (more) free trade and liberalization more broadly speaking. While functionalism assumed a 
general demand for regionalism as a means of technocratic problem-solving across borders, neofunction-
alists emphasize the role of interest groups, professional associations, producer groups and labor unions, 
which do not equally benefit from regionalism. Those who benefit form transnational coalitions with like-
minded groups from other member states and ally with regional actors. Thus, European companies joined 
forces with the European Commission to propel the Single European Market and the European Currency 
(Sandholtz/Zysman 1989; Cowles 1995), and American business forcefully lobbied in favor of the NAFTA 
and APEC agreements (Milner 1995; Cameron/Tomlin 2002). 
Liberal intergovernmentalism and second image approaches to International Relations also take economic 
and social interests as the starting point of the demand for economic regionalism (Rogowski 1989; Solingen 
1998; Hiscox 2006; Frieden 2002; Moravcsik 1997). Yet, these interests are channeled through the domes-
tic political process of interest aggregation and interest representation rather than transnational channels. 
States are the master of regional organizations and gate-keep access to international decision-making pro-
cesses. Domestic interest groups may try to circumvent them by forming transnational alliances but when 
push comes to shove they have to rely on their governments if they want to influence regional policy out-
comes and institutional reforms (Moravcsik 1998). Depending on their access to domestic decision-making 
processes and their action capacity, pro-integration interests are more or less successful in making their 
political demand for regional integration heard (Rogowski 1989; Milner 1997).
Rationalist society-centered theories, which focus on preferences in domestic and transnational society to 
generate the demand for economic regionalism explicitly or implicitly, presuppose liberal democracy and 
advanced market economy as context conditions for regionalism to unfold. Societal interests are unlikely 
to form and mobilize in favor of regionalism in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries with low 
levels of socio-economic development and/or low levels of economic and social transactions (Haas 1961; 
Haas/Schmitter 1964). This “liberal” bias limits the applicability of society-centered theories to the OECD 
world of industrialized liberal democracies; they have a harder time to explain economic regionalism in 
other parts of the world. Moreover, societal demand is hardly sufficient – it takes political leadership and 
international institutions to propel regionalism (see below).18 | KFG Working Paper No. 28| August 2011 
While rationalist approaches start from different levels of analysis, they take economic regionalism as a 
strategic response of states and economic actors to the challenges of globalization. The demand is hence 
driven by economic interdependence. Variation in (institutional) outcomes is explained by the higher de-
gree of economic interdependence fueling the demand for regional institutions to settle resulting conflicts 
(Mansfield 1998; Mansfield/Milner 1997; Mattli 1999b; Moravcsik 1998; Stone Sweet/Caporaso 1998), the 
level of uncertainty, the nature of the problem, the number of actors and the asymmetry between them 
(Stein 1983; Koremenos et al. 2001, 2004). Geographic proximity and democracy seem to increase the 
intensity of economic exchange between countries, and hence foster regional cooperation (Mansfield et 
al. 2000). Such rationalist-interest based reasoning has been extended to political	and	security	regional-
ism focusing on so-called spill-over effects, on the one hand, and other benefits than increasing trade and 
investment, on the other. 
(Neo)functionalist approaches do not only provide an explanation for progressing economic regionalism 
by societal demand. Economic regionalism is also a means to overcome the resistance of national govern-
ments against the delegation of policies and political authority in the areas of defense and war, currency 
and domestic law and order, which lie at core of state sovereignty (Mitrany 1966: 25; Haas 1967: 323; 
Lindberg/Scheingold 1970: 263-266). The link between economic, political and security regionalism is the 
so-called “functional spill-over” (Haas 1958). Member states are willing to delegate policy tasks and politi-
cal authority on economic issues of lower salience. Once the process is set into motion, however, further 
delegation is required in order to maintain and increase the economic benefits. Liberalizing trade not only 
leads to greater flows in goods but also in capital, services and people, which are still subject to national 
control reducing the economic gains of transborder transactions. Therefore, the EU has subsequently re-
moved national barriers to the free movements of goods, services, capital, and labor. This process has not 
been limited to legal, technical, and fiscal barriers but has also led to the increasing elimination of physical 
border controls. The Europe without borders, however, has given rise to significant problems for internal 
security, caused by illegal immigration, organized crime, and transnational terrorism. As a result, the mem-
ber states gave the EU the authority to legislate on a whole range of internal security issues, including visa, 
migration, asylum, criminal prosecution, and law enforcement. The spill-over from economic to security re-
gionalism evolved over a period of more than 40 years. Moreover, the EU member states remain reluctant 
to delegate authority to the EU when it comes to external security; unlike justice and home affairs, foreign 
and defense policy is still largely intergovernmental (cf. Börzel 2005). While neofunctionalist approaches 
have a hard time to explain the gap between internal and external security integration, the EU is a prime 
example of how economic regionalism fosters political and security regionalism among states that engage 
in mutual economic exchange.
The delegation of economic and security policies to regional institutions can also be explained by politi-
cal rather than economic rationalities. Milward argued that national governments seek to isolate politi-
cal decisions with redistributional consequences from particularistic domestic interests by transferring 
them to the EU level (Milward 1992; cf. Moravcsik 1998). Unlike neofunctionalist reasoning, the political 
rationale also applies in regions that lack economic interdependence as a major driver for regionalism. 
African, Latin American, Arab and Asian leaders have supported regionalism as a source of domestic power 
and consolidation of national sovereignty (Herbst 2007; Okolo 1985; Nesadurai 2008; Barnett/Solingen 
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regionalism” (Söderbaum 2004) because they are more dependent on economic growth to forge domestic 
stability, tackle societal problems, and strengthen their international standing in terms of bargaining power 
and legitimacy (Aschhoff 2012). Moreover, non-state actors can more easily circumvent their governments 
in seeking transnational exchange (Bach 2005). Yet, states must not be too weak either – political instability 
can be a major obstacle to regionalism (Edi 2007). Furthermore, the lack of state capacity creates serious 
issues for the effectiveness of regional organizations when it comes to compliance with regional norms and 
rules (Goltermann 2012). The same ambivalence can be found for neo-patrimonialism. While regional or-
ganizations provide governments with additional perks for buying-off the loyalty of their clients (Kirschner/
Stapel 2012), regionalism can also curb resources, e.g. by decreasing tariff revenues (Allison 2008; Collins 
2009). Finally, regionalism has served as a tool for settling conflicts and securing peace among (former) rival 
nations (Oelsner 2004; Acharya 2001; Francis 2006; Gruber 2000) and, more recently, for consolidating and 
promoting democracy in its member states (Pevehouse 2005; Ribeiro Hoffmann/van der Vleuten 2007). 
What national governments lose in authority to regional institutions, they gain in problem-solving capacity, 
particularly since many societal problems, such as environmental pollution, pandemics, drug trafficking or 
migration, are no longer confined to the boundaries of the nation-state. 
Constructivist	approaches put ideas, norms, identities, and discourses as ideational drivers of regionalism 
center stage. Long before the constructivist turn in IR, transactionalism argued that successful integra-
tion requires a sense of community (Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler/Barnett 1998; Acharya 2001). It is unclear, 
however, whether collective identity is a precondition for or rather an indicator of regional integration. 
Students of European integration still argue to what extent the EU has built a common identity and what it 
is based upon (Risse 2010). While the sense of community is weaker in North America, Africa, the Middle 
East or Asia, the question remains whether this is because states are so diverse with regard to their politi-
cal systems, societal structures and cultures that there is no demand for (stronger) common institutions 
(Barnett/Solingen 2007). Or are regional institutions not strong enough to breed a community (Clarkson 
2008; Acharya 2005; Jones/Smith 2007; Barnett 1995; Okolo 1985)?
While the IPE and the European Integration literature focus on different forms of regionalism, they both 
offer convincing arguments why states should delegate policy tasks and authority to regional institutions 
in the first place. They are less compelling in explaining the differential outcomes we find across different 
regions. Economic interdependence has been a key driver of economic regionalism both in Europe and 
North America. But why have the European states opted for subsequently deepening and widening the EU 
while the US, Canada and Mexico concluded a “complete contract” (Cooley/Spruyt 2009), which does not 
preview any further delegation of policies and political authority to NAFTA (Kanthak 2012)? Why do we find 
a gap in the delegation of authority between internal and external security in the EU (Börzel 2005)? Why 
have some of the African countries in absence of any economic interdependence delegated more political 
authority to regional institutions than the EU member states? Likewise, why have China, Japan and South 
Korea not been willing to set-up any regional institutions despite their high levels of economic exchange?20 | KFG Working Paper No. 28| August 2011 
4.2		 The	Supply	of	Regionalism.	Interests,	Power,	and	Norms
Rationalist	approaches tend to assume that demand is sufficient for regionalism to emerge. At the same 
time, regime theory and neoliberal institutionalism contend that international cooperation requires politi-
cal leadership and international institutions to work. Setting-up institutions to overcome market failures 
and collective action problems involves costs, too, and may create a(nother) collective action problem. 
The rationalist solution is political or hegemonic leadership. For neofunctionalism, regional bureaucracies, 
such as the European Commission, are most likely to exercise the necessary leadership to translate social 
demands into reforms of regional institutions. Supranational actors are the natural ally of interest groups 
in overcoming the resistance of national governments to delegate political authority and additional tasks 
to the regional level (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963). Legal approaches and the so-called supranational institu-
tionalists emphasize the role of centralized dispute-settlement bodies and their judicialization as engines 
of regional integration (Burley/Mattli 1993; Stone Sweet/Sandholtz 1998a; Stone Sweet 2000).
Hegemonic stability theory, by contrast, points to powerful states, which are willing to and capable of 
acting as “regional paymaster, easing distributional tensions and thus smoothing the path of integration” 
(Mattli 1999a: 56; cf. Gilpin 1987: 87-90; Yarbrough/Yarbrough 1992). Yet, they supply regionalism for dif-
ferent reasons. The US, China, Russia, South Africa or Nigeria supported and engaged in region-building for 
their geostrategic and economic interests in strengthening military alliances, promoting stability in neigh-
boring countries, or securing access to new markets, cheap labor, water, and energy resources (Antkiewicz/
Whalley 2005; Gowa 1994; Clarkson 2008; Coleman 2007: 155-184). The US played a key role in the cre-
ation and prevalence of the European Community and ASEAN by mitigating the security dilemma in the 
region (Gruber 2000; Acharya 2001). It has also acted as a regional hegemon for NAFTA to counterbalance 
the Single European Market (Clarkson 2008). Likewise, Brazil and Venezuela have championed MERCOSUR 
to establish itself as a regional power and to contain US influence in Latin America (Gomez Mera 2005; 
Tussie 2009; Hummel/Lohaus 2012). A similar competition for containing external and exercising regional 
hegemonic power through promoting (different forms of) regionalism can be observed between Iraq and 
Egypt in the League of Arab States (Khadduri 1946), Malaysia and Indonesia in ASEAN (Dent 2008: 86-88), 
Japan and China in East Asia (Beeson 2006), Nigeria and South Africa in Sub-Saharan Africa (Francis 2006), 
and Russia and Uzbekistan in Central Asia (Kubicek 1997; Wirminghaus 2012). Regional powers can be en-
gines of integration, as France and Germany have been in the EU and Brazil and Argentina are in Mercosur 
(Porrata-Doria Jr 2005), although the latter have been criticized for not providing sufficient regional leader-
ship (Mattli 1999a: 160). Conversely, the absence or ineffectiveness of regionalism in the Middle East or 
Asia is often blamed on the absence of a regional or external hegemon (Fawcett/Gandois 2010; Hemmer/
Katzenstein 2002).
While using regionalism to establish and affirm their regional hegemony, powerful states are reluctant to 
bind themselves by regional institutions. The intergovernmental nature of MERCOSUR and NAFTA and 
their limited scope of regional integration are largely explained by the unwillingness of Brazil and the US 
to delegate authority to regional institutions (Hummel/Lohaus 2012; Kanthak 2012). At the same time, the 
US has agreed to a highly legalized and inflexible agreement that does not leave much levy to the member 
states. This degree of self-binding goes far beyond what other regional powers have committed to and 
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of Nigeria in ECOWAS seems to suggest (Striebinger 2012). Brazil has to compromise with Argentina since 
the US provides an exit option for the latter. Interpresidentialism plays a key role in the functioning of 
MERCOSUR (Hummel/Lohaus 2012). Leadership by government diplomacy provides a functional equiva-
lent for regional institutions, not only in MERCOSUR but also in ASEAN through the so-called ASEAN way 
(Kanthak 2012). Finally, power-based theories of regionalism have little on offer to explain the differential 
commitment of small states. Paraguay, Uruguay, Mexico and Canada may seek to bind their regional he-
gemon (Hummel/Lohaus 2012; Kanthak 2012; Spielau 2012). However, by joining MERCOSUR and NAFTA, 
respectively, they also become (even) more vulnerable to its dominance. Moreover, why is it that some for-
mer Soviet republics decided to bandwagon with Russia and Uzbekistan while others engaged in attempts 
to counterbalance their regional dominance (Wirminghaus 2012)?
Constructivist	approaches	have featured less prominently in explaining the supply of regional institutions. 
Hemmer and Katzenstein have argued that the US was less enthusiastic to exercise hegemonic leadership 
in Asia than in Europe because of the lower cultural affinity (Hemmer/Katzenstein 2002; Katzenstein 2005). 
Cultural difference is also to account for the distinct approach ASEAN states have taken towards regional 
integration. The “ASEAN way”, which is based on informal consensus-building, organizational minimalism, 
and thin institutionalization, is incompatible with Western models of legalized institutions (Acharya 2004; 
Katzenstein 2005; Nesadurai 2009). Such explanations have an essentialist flavor and lose a lot of their 
explanatory power when applied across regions. More importantly, social constructivism has to offer more 
general explanations for why, when and where regionalism emerges focusing on processes of diffusion.
The supply of regional institutions can stem from other regions or international actors, which actively pro-
mote or passively provide blue-prints for region-building. “Pax Americana” and “Pax Europaea” are two 
“global scripts” (Meyer et al. 1992) on regionalism. The first one is based on regional trade cooperation 
promoted by the US and international organizations, including the World Trade Organization, the World 
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (Grugel 2004). The second is advocated by the EU, striving for 
regional integration, which is broader in scope and infringes more strongly on the sovereignty of states 
(Börzel/Risse 2009). As we have seen in the previous section, there are interesting institutional similarities 
among major regional organizations, which are not easily explained by functionalist approaches. Market or 
problem pressures may increase the demand for (more) regional institutions. But even if certain institutions 
effectively serve specific functions and help solve similar problems, states always have choices. Institutions 
can be “contagious” (Levi-Faur 2005) under conditions of uncertainty, policy failure and dissatisfaction with 
the status quo. Regional organizations that struggle to become more effective may look to other organiza-
tions that are considered as success cases for policies and rules that effectively solved similar problems and 
are transferable into their context (Meyer/Rowan 1977; Dolowitz/Marsh 2000). Next to lesson-drawing, 
regions may also emulate others for normative reasons, to increase their legitimization (symbolic imita-
tion; see Polillo/Guillén 2005) or to simply imitate their behavior because its appropriateness is taken for 
granted (mimicry; see Haveman 1993; Meyer/Rowan 1977). Seeking international legitimacy and signaling 
commitment to trade liberalization motivated ASEAN to set-up a dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) 
that has been hardly used so far (Korte 2012). Emulation also might be driving the recent deepening and 
broadening of ASEAN, whose new Charta bears some striking resemblance with EU institutions (Jetschke 
2010; Katsumata 2009). Likewise, ECOWAS and LAS might be following a global script that entails the es-
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a reference model (Koitsch 2012). With the establishment of the Euro, the EU has become an example to 
follow for countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, which may defy supranationalism but see a common 
currency as an anchor of regional stability (Lorca-Susino 2010). Whether the EU will continue to inspire 
other regions to seek economic and monetary integration will depend on the EU mastering the current 
financial crisis. Will the EU deepen integration and develop common economic and fiscal policies or will its 
member states relapse in defensive nationalism as they did during the oil crisis in the early 1970?
The comparative evaluation of mainstream theories reveals important drivers of regionalism. None of them 
is capable of fully explaining variation across time and regions. Nor have they much to say about why such 
diverse regional organizations as LAS and ECOWAS appear to develop similar institutions. Yet, the different 
drivers could be combined as long as their ontological assumptions are compatible. The theoretically con-
sistent rather than eclectic combination of demand and supply variables sheds new light on old puzzles and 
gives rise to new questions. It remains to be seen to what extent it will form the basis for new approaches 
that can account for the spread of shallow economic regionalism, on the one hand, and the deepening and 
widening of existing forms of regionalism, on the other.
5.  When Regionalism Hits Home. Policy Harmonization and Structural Change 
5.1		 From	Second	Image	Reversed...
Second image reversed approaches in IR explore the impact of the international system upon domestic 
politics (Gourevitch 1978). They have made little headway in comparative regionalism. Economists have 
explored the economic effects of regional free trade agreements on trade and investment flows, economic 
growth, poverty, and social inequality (Weintraub 2004; Preusse 2004; Musila 2005). Their impact on do-
mestic policies, institutions, and political processes has remained largely ignored. Studies have looked for 
policy harmonization in different sectors for individual countries, particularly in the case of NAFTA. The 
literature has also started to explore processes of “differential empowerment” in the case of subnational 
actors (regional and local authorities, companies, civil society organizations) through their access to new 
markets and policy-making arenas (Aspinwall 2009; Acharya 2001: 48). Yet, the findings are hardly gener-
alizable and seldom guided by theoretical considerations.
A noticeable exception is the study of Jon Pevehouse, who explores the effect of regional organizations 
on democratization (Pevehouse 2005; cf. Anderson 1999). He argues that the “democratic density” of re-
gional organizations is associated with the democratic consolidation of their members due to conditional-
ity and assistance. ECOWAS can even invoke military coercion to prevent coup d’états (Striebinger 2012). 
Governments of young democracies can bind themselves and their successors to political liberalization and 
democratic norms by external commitment (Pevehouse 2005: 37; Mansfield/Pevehouse 2006; Moravcsik/
Vachudova 2003). Democracies do not only show greater commitment to regional organizations (Kirschner/
Stapel 2012). Joining a democratic regional organization significantly decreases the probability of demo-
cratic breakdown (Pevehouse 2005; Pirzer 2012), even though it may require a regional hegemon and/
or international and domestic pressure to make the regional organization actively intervene (Striebinger 
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IPE and Compliance research have more generally investigated the role of international institutions for 
domestic change. After all, international organizations, such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, substantially interfere with the governance institutions of developing countries. Likewise, 
most regional organizations can use conditionality to promote structural adjustments by promising or grant-
ing additional benefits, such as financial and technical assistance, loans, debt relief, or membership in an 
organization conditional. Or they incur costs through economic and diplomatic sanctions. “Reinforcement 
through reward” (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2006) or “correction through punishment” offer the op-
portunity for a redistribution of resources among domestic actors empowering those who push for do-
mestic change (Risse et al. 1999; Milner 1988; Rogowski 1989). Alternatively, regional organizations can 
resort to political dialogue and other instruments of socialization, which seek to change actors’ behavior 
through persuasion and learning, often with the help of change agents or entrepreneurs (Finnemore 1993; 
Finnemore/Sikkink 1998; Checkel 2005; Kelley 2004a). Conditionality and political dialogue both aim at 
influencing the choice of actors, be they informed by cost-benefit calculations or guided by normative 
concerns about socially accepted behavior. They thus contrast with coercion and assistance, which are not 
captured by the two general logics of domestic change. While coercion does not leave actors any choice, 
assistance provides unconditional financial and technical aid that shall enable actors to make choices in 
the first place.
The workings of these causal pathways through which regional organizations may impact upon the domes-
tic structures of their members have so far only been systematically explored for the case of the EU.
5.2		 ...	to	Europeanization	and	Domestic	Change
In the 1990s, students of European integration became increasingly interested in how the member states 
responded to the impact of European policies, processes, and institutions.8 The first generation of such 
“top-down” studies focused on the consequences of European integration for the autonomy and authority 
of the member states. In order to theorize the domestic impact of Europe, the explanatory logics of the 
two major paradigms of European integration were essentially turned around. If intergovernmentalist 
approaches were correct in assuming that member state governments controlled European integration 
while supranational institutions themselves exercised little independent effect, the power of the member 
states would not be challenged. Rather, European integration should enhance the control of national 
governments over domestic affairs since it removed issues from domestic controversy into the arena of 
executive control at the European level (Milward 1992; Moravcsik 1994). Proponents of neofunctionalist or 
supranationalist approaches suggested exactly the opposite, namely that European integration provided 
domestic actors, such as regions and interest groups, with independent channels of political access and 
influence at the European level enabling them to circumvent or by-pass their member states in the EU 
policy process (Marks 1993; Marks et al. 1996). Between the two competing paradigms, a third group of 
scholars emerged that rejected the zero-sum game conception of the relationship between the EU and its 
8  Economists, of course, have been more interested in the economic effects of European integration; see e.g. 
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member states, in which one level was to be empowered at the expense of the other. They argued that the 
different levels of government would become increasingly dependent on each other in European policy-
making. As a result, European integration would neither strengthen nor weaken but transform the member 
states by fostering the emergence of cooperative relationships between state and non-state actors at the 
various levels of government (Kohler-Koch 1996; Rhodes 1996; Kohler-Koch/Eising 1999).
In recent years, the “top-down” literature has grown significantly and developed its own approaches to 
analyzing the effect of the evolving European system of governance on the member states (cf. Cowles et 
al. 2001; Featherstone/Radaelli 2003; Bulmer/Lequesne 2005; Graziano/Vink 2006). Most studies agree 
that member state responses to Europeanization are differential, i.e. differ across policy sectors, institu-
tions, and time. While EU policies and institutions are an impetus of domestic change that is a constant 
for all member states, they have facilitated domestic reforms but not necessarily led to convergence of 
national polities, politics, or policies. To solve the empirical puzzle, the literature has drawn on two dif-
ferent strands of institutionalist thinking. Rationalist and constructivist approaches of Europeanization 
both assume that the misfit between European and domestic policies, institutions and political processes 
constitutes a necessary condition for domestic change and that institutions mediate or filter the domestic 
impact of Europe, which emanates from pressure of adaptation caused by such misfit. They differ, however, 
in their assumptions in exactly how institutions matter (cf. Börzel/Risse 2003). 
Rational choice institutionalism argues that the EU facilitates domestic change through changing oppor-
tunity structures for domestic actors. In a first step, misfit between the EU and domestic norms creates 
demands for domestic adaptation. It takes agency, however, to translate misfit into domestic change. In 
a second step, the downloading of EU policies and institutions by the member states are shaped by cost/
benefit calculations of strategic actors whose interests are at stake. Institutions constrain or enable cer-
tain actions of rational actors by rendering some options more costly than others. From this perspective, 
Europeanization is largely conceived as an emerging political opportunity structure which offers some 
actors additional resources to exert influence, while severely constraining the ability of others to pursue 
their goals. Domestic change is facilitated, if the institutions of the member states do not allow domestic 
actors to block adaptation to EU requirements through veto points or if, on the contrary, they empower 
domestic reform coalitions by providing them with additional resources to exploit the opportunities of-
fered by Europeanization. 
Other parts of the Europeanization literature draw on sociological institutionalism in order to specify 
change mechanisms based on ideational and normative processes of Europeanization. Unlike its rational-
ist counterpart, sociological institutionalism draws on a normative logic of appropriateness which argues 
that actors are guided by collectively shared understandings of what constitutes proper, socially accepted 
behavior. These collective understandings and intersubjective meaning structures strongly influence the 
way actors define their goals and what they perceive as rational action. Rather than maximizing their 
egoistic self-interest, actors seek to meet social expectations in a given situation. From this perspective, 
Europeanization is understood as the emergence of new rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning 
to which member states are exposed and which they have to incorporate into their domestic structures. 
If there is such a misfit, it also takes agency for bringing about domestic change. But the ways in which 
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or advocacy networks, socialize domestic actors into new norms and rules of appropriateness through 
persuasion and social learning who redefine their interests and identities accordingly. The more active 
norm entrepreneurs are and the more they succeed in making EU policies resonate with domestic norms 
and beliefs, the more successful they will be in bringing about domestic change. Moreover, collective 
understandings of appropriate behavior strongly influence the ways in which domestic actors download 
EU requirements. First, a consensus-oriented or cooperative decision-making culture helps to overcome 
multiple veto points by rendering their use for actors inappropriate. Second, a consensus-oriented politi-
cal culture allows for a sharing of adaptational costs which facilitates the accommodation of pressure for 
adaptation. Rather than shifting adaptational costs upon a social or political minority, the “winners” of 
domestic change compensate the “losers”.
The Eastern enlargement of the EU created a unique opportunity for the next generation of Europeanization 
research to test the approaches that had emerged to account for the conditions and causal mechanisms 
through which the EU triggers domestic change. The two logics of Europeanization were applied and 
adapted to studying the domestic impact of the EU’s attempt to transfer its policies and institutions to 
candidate countries (cf. Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005; Sedelmeier 2006; Schimmelfennig 2007; Kelley 
2004b; Epstein 2008) and increasingly also to its Eastern and Southern neighbors in the former Soviet 
Union and the Mediterranean, respectively (Lavenex et al. 2007; Lavenex 2008; Schimmelfennig/Scholtz 
2009; Börzel 2011; van Hüllen 2012).
Findings on “Accession Europeanization” and “Neighborhood Europeanization” have corroborated the 
differential impact of Europe. While domestic mediating factors played a less prominent role than in 
”Membership Europeanization”, they did mitigate the domestic impact of accession, particularly beyond 
the legal implementation of EU policies. In case of the accession countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), the dominance of differential empowerment through conditionality has given rise to concerns about 
“shallow Europeanization” (Goetz 2005: 262) since sustainable compliance with (costly) EU policies ulti-
mately requires internalization. The CEE countries formally adopted a massive amount of EU legislation, 
which, however, has often not been properly applied and enforced and thus, has not changed actors’ 
behavior (Falkner et al. 2008; Börzel 2009). The neighborhood countries have largely resisted domestic 
change. Their deficient democratic institutions and/or their limited state capacity have mitigated and con-
strained the domestic impact of the EU. High misfit imposing prohibitive costs to incumbent governments, 
weak to non-existent EU conditionality, the absence of domestic reform coalitions and weak administrative 
capacities to orchestrate reforms render domestic change induced by Europeanization extremely unlikely 
(Schimmelfennig/Scholtz 2009; Börzel 2010b; Börzel/van Hüllen 2011).
The literature on Europeanization yields important implications for the internal effects of regionalism in 
other parts of the world. The European Union certainly is a most likely case in this regard. Not only are 
EU institutions strong and its policies comprehensive. While member states often face significant misfit, 
the resonance of EU policies and institutions with their domestic structures is comparatively high. Other 
regional institutions may be less likely to deploy a transformative effect on their members. Yet, the change 
mechanisms still apply. Similar to the EU, the Mercosur, ECOWAS, the African Union or ASEAN have increas-
ingly defined institutional requirements for “good governance” which their members have to respect. Next 
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package many regional organizations seek to promote. Moreover, they have developed instruments in 
trying to shape the governance institutions of their members, which draw on similar causal mechanisms 
as the Europeanization approaches (Bruszt/McDermott 2009). To what extent regional organizations have 
had an impact on the governance structures of their members is yet to be explored. The active engage-
ment of ECOWAS and, to a lesser extent, MERCOSUR, in protecting and promoting democratic change 
still appears to be the exception rather than the rule. Yet, the case of ASEAN demonstrates that regional 
organizations can also have a less direct and probably more long-term effect, establishing a political op-
portunity structure that provides civil society actors with rights, money, and networks and entrapping their 
member states in their commitment to human rights and democracy (Krome 2012). These findings show 
that processes of “differential empowerment” found in the EU and NAFTA (Aspinwall 2009) also work in 
other regions.
6.  Conclusions
This paper has argued that the rise in regionalism does not constitute a new phenomenon. However, what 
is certainly distinct about regionalism in the 21st century is the extent to which it draws on existing forms. 
Due to its lasting success, the EU has become an important reference point in Latin America, Africa and 
Asia, as a model to emulate or to resist (Telò 2001; Farrell 2007; Henry 2007; Katsumata 2009; Jetschke 
2010).9 The EU itself has sought to supply its institutions in region-to-region dialogue and interregional 
trade agreements (De Lombaerde/Schulz 2009; Söderbaum/van Langenhove 2006; Farrel 2009). To foster 
the diffusion of regional governance structures, the EU has drawn on the same set of instruments it has 
deployed in seeking to change the domestic structures of (prospective) member states and neighboring 
countries (Börzel/Risse 2009). 
The EU’s partnership approach contrasts with that of the U.S. whose “hub and-spoke” model entails 
more asymmetrical relations and is largely restricted to economic regionalism (Grugel 2004; Farrell 2007; 
Clarkson 2008). To the extent that the U.S. promotes regional cooperation at all, it favors regional free 
trade areas rather than deeper and broader integration schemes the EU seeks to promote. Whether the 
EU is really the “hub of a global pattern of interregional relations” (Hettne 2005: 558) from which it seeks 
to reconstruct a multilateral world order in a regionalized form (multiregionalism), and to what extent this 
is part of its identity as a civilian or normative power or simply the attempt to expand its (liberal) empire 
(Manners 2002; Telò 2006; Whitman 1998; Cooper 2003) is another question.
If there is an “emerging regional architecture of world politics” (Acharya/Johnston 2007), the EU is not 
the only way for regional organizations to improve their effectiveness and legitimacy or shield themselves 
against external criticism. ECOWAS, for instance, has served as a role model in security integration for 
other African regional organizations (Holt/Shanahan 2005). While there is certainly not one dominant 
form, regionalism has become part of a global governance script, in which region-building does not only 
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feature as an effective and legitimate way to foster peace and prosperity but which sees “regions as the 
fundamental, even driving force of world politics” (Fawn 2009).
Regionalism has gained prominence in the 21st century, not only as a form of economic, political, and 
social organization, but also as a field of study. The debate on the rise of regionalism shows that we need 
to have a clear understanding of what we mean by regionalism and how we measure it. More than 40 
years ago, Joseph Nye complained that “integration theorists have talked past each other” using different 
concepts and measurements (Nye 1968: 855). His criticism still holds today – there is a Babylonian variety 
of definitions and analytical frameworks and only a few students of regionalism have engaged in a system-
atic comparison of different forms around the globe. In some ways, research on old regionalism was more 
comparative than many studies of new regionalism (see for instance Etzioni 1965; Haas/Schmitter 1964; 
Nye 1970, 1971). Systematically exploring the genesis, growth, institutional design, and effectiveness of 
regional organizations across time and space puts mainstream approaches to a serious test and the debate 
about new regionalism into perspective. There are many “roads to regionalism” (Börzel et al. 2012) and 
not all of them lead to new forms of regionalism. Regions outside Europe leave much to be explored with 
regard to why states build, develop, join and leave regional organizations.28 | KFG Working Paper No. 28| August 2011 
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